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MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT            PART I                          STATEMENT OF FACTS 
 
 1 
 2 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA 3 
(On application for leave to appeal from the Court of Appeal for the Province of 4 
British Columbia) 5 
 6 
 7 
BETWEEN: 8 
JAMES ROGER DEMERS 9 
            Applicant 10 
-and- 11 
 12 
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN 13 
          Respondent 14 
 15 
MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT 16 
 17 
 18 
PART I – STATEMENT OF FACTS 19 
 20 
 21 
OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES OF PUBLIC IMPORTANCE 22 
1. First, this leave application invites the Court to decide whether the Access to Abortion 23 
Services Act (the “Act”), which violates Mr. Demers’ s. 2 right to freedom of expression, can be 24 
saved under s. 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms R.S.C. (1982) (the 25 
“Charter”).  26 
2. This Court has ruled in previous cases that the value of speech depends at least in part on 27 
its content.  Mr. Demers’ right to freedom of expression against abortion cannot be weighed 28 
against competing interests under s. 1 without first identifying those interests and determining 29 
their value. 30 
3. In this case competing interests cannot be weighed unless the nature of unborn children as 31 
human beings is acknowledged and their value assessed.  The courts below erred by failing to 32 
expressly acknowledge that unborn children are human beings, and, therefore, the courts never 33 
assessed their value. 34 
 35 
 36 
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4. Secondly, this leave application invites the Court to decide the closely related issue of 1 
whether unborn children have a right to have their lives protected under s. 7 of the Charter.  2 
Determination of whether unborn children are human beings for s. 1 purposes is inextricably 3 
linked to the determination of their right to life under s. 7 of the Charter. 4 
5. Although there are proper bases for treating some human beings or groups of human 5 
beings differently from others under the law, the state can never justify denying any human being 6 
or group of human beings all protection of law. 7 
6. If the term “everyone” as used in s. 7 of the Charter is not interpreted to include every 8 
human being then life would be converted into a mere privilege that the state may grant or 9 
withhold at will.  The language of the international human rights treaties makes no such 10 
distinction between human beings entitled to juridical status as persons and human beings not so 11 
entitled. 12 
7. Neither the Crown nor any lower court has identified any fundamental principle of justice 13 
under the common law or the international law of human rights that would justify the intentional 14 
taking of innocent life. 15 
8. A human being may not be deprived of his right to life through a section 1 balancing of 16 
interests analysis.  The common law and international law are in accord on this principle as well.  17 
The necessity defense does not permit the intentional taking of innocent human life.  18 
International law identifies the right to life as nonderogable, meaning that innocent life may not 19 
be balanced away against other interests even in the event of national emergency. 20 
9. The courts below, in reliance on Winnipeg Child and Family Services v. G.(D.F.), have 21 
divorced Charter interpretation from language, morals, science, religion, and common law.  This 22 
so-called “normative approach” is pure legal positivism in which law is reduced to nothing more 23 
than the will of the state.  The “normative approach” contradicts principles of interpretation that 24 
the Supreme Court of Canada has relied upon in numerous other cases. 25 
10. Even if this Court should simply that unborn children are the only class of human beings 26 
completely outside the protection of law, it cannot avoid determining their inherent worth for  27 
purposes of weighing Mr. Demers’ right to free expression against competing interests under s. 1. 28 
 29 
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HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS 1 
11. The Abortion Services Access Zone Regulation (the “Regulation”) was made pursuant to 2 
s. 5 of the Access to Abortion Services Act, R.S.B.C. 1995, c. 44.  Section 1 and Appendix 1 of 3 
the Regulation establish an access zone approximately 30 metres surrounding the Everywoman’s 4 
Health Centre (the “Clinic”). 5 
12. Mr. Demers’ trial commenced on October 20, 1997, before The Honourable Judge H. J. 6 
McGivern in the Provincial Court of British Columbia at Vancouver.  In a decision dated 7 
December 19, 1997, Judge McGivern convicted Mr. Demers of  “sidewalk interference” and 8 
“protest” contrary to ss. 2(1)(a) and 2 (1)(b) of the Act, both being contrary to s. 14 of the Act (the 9 
charging section). 10 
13. The Honourable Mr. Justice Hood, in the Supreme Court of British Columbia, by a 11 
judgment dated August 3, 1999, upheld the decision of Judge McGivern.  12 
14. The Honourable Mr. Justice Low writing for the Court of Appeal for British Columbia 13 
dismissed Mr. Demers’ appeal in his Reasons for Judgment dated January 17, 2003.  14 
 15 
FACTS 16 
15. On December 6, 9, and 10, 1996, on the public sidewalk outside of the Clinic in the 17 
access zone, Mr. Demers displayed a sign: “Every human being has the inherent right to life. 18 
United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”  On December 11, 1996, 19 
Mr. Demers displayed a different sign:   20 
Every person has the right to have his life respected.  This right shall be 21 
protected by law, in general, from the moment of conception. 22 
Art. 4-1 American Convention of Human Rights. 23 
16. On December 11, 1996, Mr. Demers was charged with “protest” under ss. 2(1)(b) and 24 
14(2) of the Act.  He was later charged with “sidewalk interference” under s. 2(1)(a) of the Act.  25 
The Act, s. 1, defines “protest” to include any act of disapproval of abortion and “sidewalk 26 
interference” to include informing a person about abortion-related issues.  Mr. Demers admitted 27 
to carrying a sign that disapproved of abortion in the access zone surrounding the Clinic. 28 
 29 
 30 
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17. Mr. Demers was cordial and cooperative when interacting with the police.  There was no 1 
evidence of any exchange between Mr. Demers and any patients or Clinic personnel entering or 2 
exiting the Clinic while he was outside it, nor was there any evidence of anyone being offended 3 
or upset by the sign or his presence. 4 
18. Most abortions are done for non-medical reasons.  Women seeking abortions often feel 5 
pressured to have abortions or are “sacrificing themselves” for someone else.  Many women are 6 
coerced into having abortions and do not choose freely; some because they do not have sufficient 7 
information.  Witnesses who had abortions were not made aware of the availability of either pre-8 
abortion or post-abortion counseling.  9 
19. Many women are ambivalent about whether to have abortions, and are open to discussion 10 
and guidance right up to the last moment.  Clinic Staff admitted that some women who come into 11 
the Clinic change their minds.  Many children scheduled to die are alive because of their 12 
mothers’ contact with a pro-life counselor. 13 
20. Pro-life advocates inform women about abortion and the alternatives, offer emotional and 14 
financial support and try to persuade them not to terminate their pregnancies.  They give out 15 
pamphlets accurately depicting and describing the stages of development of the unborn child.  16 
Women have thanked pro-life advocates for their kindness, and expressed gratitude for offers of 17 
help and concern.  18 
21. Dr. Marie Peeters gave expert testimony on the early development and humanity of the 19 
unborn child.  No Crown witness denied the rapid development of the unborn child in the womb, 20 
nor did any deny that abortion ends the life of a human being.  Abortion service provider, Ms. 21 
Joy Thompson, admitted that the fetus is “a human being not yet born.”  However abortion 22 
service providers discounted the humanity of the fetus in their counseling. 23 
22. Crown witness Dr. R. E. K. Hudson indicated that informing women on the development 24 
of unborn children prior to an abortion is inappropriate.  Dr. Hudson has been instrumental in the 25 
government’s plan to expand abortion services throughout the province. 26 
23. The Crown’s evidence confirmed that the essential purpose of abortion clinic counseling 27 
is to affirm women to go through with an abortion.  Abortion counselor Ms. Erin Mullan stated, 28 
 29 
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“Women will feel an abortion is a loss,” and admitted that the loss was the loss of a human life. 1 
24. Psychiatrist R. Philip Ney testified that abortion severely harms women psychologically 2 
and emotionally.  Ms. Patricia Hansard, founder of Abortion Recovery Canada testified to the 3 
same.  The harm is a direct psychological consequence of deliberately killing one’s own children. 4 
 5 
 6 
THE JUDGMENTS BELOW 7 
(i) The Decision of the Trial Judge in Regina v. Lewis (January 23, 1996) 8 
25. This case is a companion case to R. v. Lewis, [1996] 18 B.C.L.R. (3d) 218 (Prov. Ct.)) in 9 
which the defendant Maurice Lewis was tried and the charges dismissed on virtually the same 10 
evidence as this case.  Judge E. J. Cronin, who presided over the trial, ruled that the Act violated 11 
Mr. Lewis’ s. 2 Charter rights and could not be saved under a section 1 analysis.   12 
(ii) The Decision of the Supreme Court in Regina v. Lewis (October 8, 1996)  13 
26.  In R. v. Lewis, [1996] 24 B.C.L.R. (3d) 247 (S.C.), Saunders J. (as she then was) agreed 14 
that the impugned sections of the Act were inconsistent with the freedoms guaranteed by ss. 2(a), 15 
(b) and (d) of the Charter, but found the infringements justified under s. 1 of the Charter.  In 16 
doing so, she allowed the Crown’s appeal from the judgment of His Honour Judge Cronin.  She 17 
failed, however, to rule as to whether unborn children are human beings.  Because Mr. Lewis did 18 
not raise the question of the unborn child’s right to life under s. 7 of the Charter that issue was 19 
not decided.  Mr. Lewis died before his appeal to the Court of Appeal for British Columbia could 20 
be heard. 21 
(iii)  The Decision of the Trial Judge in Regina v. Demers (December 19, 1997) 22 
27. The Learned Trial Judge, H.J. McGivern, concluded that “everyone” and “every 23 
individual,” as used in s. 7 and s. 15 of the Charter, do not include an unborn child of a woman 24 
who chooses to abort her child. Ct. File No. 14490-02-c at 2.  He also held that, if Mr. Demers’ 25 
rights as guaranteed by s. 2 of the Charter were violated by the provisions of the Act, he was 26 
unable to distinguish the circumstances of this case from those in Lewis. Ibid. at 6-7. 27 
 28 
 29 
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(iv) The Decision of the Supreme Court in Regina v. Demers (August 3, 1999) 1 
28. Counsel initially argued the appeal before Madam Justice Levine in January, 1999.  2 
Levine J. recused herself before argument was completed.  She ordered that the original exhibits 3 
filed in Lewis be transferred to form part of the record to the summary appeal matter before her, 4 
by consent.  The Court marked the transcript and exhibits from the Lewis case as exhibits in the 5 
present case.  6 
29. Counsel then argued the appeal before Mr. Justice Hood.  Hood J. found that:  “a woman 7 
has the absolute right to terminate her pregnancy, and she cannot be deterred by any right of the 8 
unborn child because it does not possess any rights until it is born.” Docket No. CC980044 at p. 9 
18, para. 37.  He ruled that the term “everyone” in international law does not include the unborn. 10 
Ibid. at 25, paras. 52, 53.  He also ruled that the term “everyone” in s. 7 of the Charter does not 11 
include the unborn. Ibid. at p. 42, para. 87.  Mr. Justice Hood did not expressly address s. 2 of the 12 
Charter in his reasons, but it is implicit that he too considered himself bound by the decision of 13 
Saunders J. in Lewis. Ibid. at p. 3, para. 3. 14 
(v) The Decision of the Court of Appeal for British Columbia (January 17, 2003)  15 
30. On January 17, 2003, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia (Low, Huddard, 16 
Newberry JJ.A.) dismissed the appeal. R. v. Demers, 2002 BCCA28; Docket No. CA026297. 17 
The court implicitly acknowledged that unborn children are human beings when it cited 18 
Morgentaler for the proposition that “any preference of foetal rights over the rights of the 19 
pregnant women . . . is a matter best left to the careful consideration of the legislators.”  But the 20 
Court gave no indication as to what value is to be placed on those lives.  The Court of Appeal 21 
expressly ruled that the term “everyone” as used in s. 7 of the Charter does not include unborn 22 
children. Ibid. at 9, par. 26.  23 
 7 
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 1 
PART II – POINTS IN ISSUE 2 
 3 
 4 
31. This leave application raises the following two related issues of public importance: 5 
 6 
I. IS AN UNBORN CHILD A HUMAN BEING WHOSE LIFE HAS 7 
INHERENT VALUE THAT MUST BE MEASURED WHEN 8 
DETERMINING WHETHER THE ACCESS TO ABORTION SERVICES 9 
ACT, WHICH VIOLATES A SUBJECT’S SECTION 2 CHARTER RIGHT 10 
TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, CAN BE SAVED UNDER SECTION 1 11 
AS “DEMONSTRABLY JUSTIFIED IN A FREE AND DEMOCRATIC 12 
SOCIETY?” 13 
 14 
 15 
II. ARE UNBORN CHILDREN THE ONLY CLASS OF HUMAN BEINGS IN 16 
CANADA WHO HAVE NO PROTECTION UNDER THE  SECTION 7 17 
CHARTER DECLARATION THAT “EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO 18 
LIFE . . . .”?  19 
 20 
 8 
 
MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT           PART III                           BRIEF OF ARGUMENT 
 
 1 
PART III – BRIEF OF ARGUMENT 2 
 3 
 4 
I. IS AN UNBORN CHILD A HUMAN BEING WHOSE LIFE HAS INHERENT 5 
VALUE THAT MUST BE MEASURED WHEN DETERMINING WHETHER 6 
THE ACCESS TO ABORTION SERVICES ACT, WHICH VIOLATES A 7 
SUBJECT’S SECTION 2 CHARTER RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, 8 
CAN BE SAVED UNDER SECTION 1 AS “DEMONSTRABLY JUSTIFIED IN A 9 
FREE AND DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY?” 10 
 11 
32. The Crown has admitted, and the lower courts acknowledged, that the Access to Abortion 12 
Services Act violates Mr. Demers’ s. 2 Charter right to freedom of expression.  Therefore, the 13 
issue is whether the Act can be saved under a section 1 Charter analysis by proof that the Act is 14 
“demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.” 15 
33. The method of analysis for s. 1 is essentially one of balancing competing interests, be 16 
they interests of individuals, groups, society or the state: 17 
[8] The bottom line is this. . . . [T]he courts must nevertheless insist that before the state 18 
can override constitutional rights, there must be a reasoned demonstration of the good 19 
which the law may achieve in relation to the seriousness of the infringement.” 20 
 RJR – MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (A.G.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at 328-29 21 
34. Courts may enlist the methodologies of inductive, deductive and intuitive reasoning to 22 
decide s. 1 issues: 23 
[6] . . . In the legal context, reason imports the notion of inference from evidence or 24 
established truths. This is not to deny intuition its role . . . .” 25 
            Ibid. 26 
35. In order to weigh the value of freedom of expression against competing interests courts 27 
must consider the content of the speech involved.  For example, some expression such as hate 28 
speech and obscenity is not as valuable as other expression. 29 
       R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697, at 762 30 
       R. v. Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452, at 500   31 
  32 
 33 
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 1 
36. Madame Justice Saunders seemed to have recognized the importance of this point but 2 
neither she nor the other courts determined whether the unborn child is a human being or what 3 
the value of its life is. She wrote: 4 
 5 
[141] Mr. Lewis contends that the truth of his message [that unborn children are 6 
human beings], and its motivation by conscience and religion, increases the value of 7 
expressive activity which is denied him by the impugned provisions of the Act. 8 
       Lewis, 24 B.C.L.R. at 290 9 
37. In order to weigh competing interests certain factual matters must be determined or truths 10 
established.  Just as one’s right to yell “fire” in a crowed theater depends on the existence of a 11 
fire, the right to yell “murder” depends on whether a human being is being killed.  In this case 12 
Mr. Demers didn’t yell.  He didn’t even speak.  He simply held up a sign that quoted an 13 
international human rights treaty. 14 
38. None of the courts below answered the critical question of whether an unborn child is a 15 
human being, despite the fact that all three methods of legal reasoning that this court articulated 16 
in RJR – MacDonald bear witness to the fact that unborn children are human beings. 17 
39. First, inductive reasoning.  Applicant presented testimony of renowned geneticist, Dr. 18 
Marie Peeters, and other scientific evidence from which no other inference can be drawn than 19 
unborn children are human beings.  There is no evidence in the record of trial from which 20 
Madame Justice Saunders could draw the conclusion that unborn children are not human beings.  21 
In fact, two of the Crown’s own witnesses, admitted abortion providers, acknowledged that 22 
unborn children are human beings.  The Court of Appeal did not make an express ruling that 23 
unborn children are or are not human beings. 24 
40. Second, deductive reasoning.  This court in RJR – MacDonald recognized that there is 25 
such a thing as “established truth” from which legal conclusions are to be drawn. RJR-26 
MacDonald, 3 S.C.R. at 328.  There are few more fundamental and important truths to establish 27 
than the identification of human beings.  Several Justices on this Court and in the courts below 28 
by implication have acknowledged that unborn children are human beings.  From Morgentaler  29 
 10 
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 1 
Justice Saunders drew the conclusion “that Parliament could enact more refined legislation to 2 
protect the rights of the foetus.”  Presumably Parliament could not confer the juridical status of 3 
personhood on mere body parts. 4 
         Lewis, 24 B.C.L.R. at 256 5 
41. Third, intuitive reasoning.  If abortion were just a medical procedure then there would be 6 
no long-term psychological harm to women resulting from it, and the impact of protests would 7 
hardly be troublesome to them.  Furthermore, if women did not intuitively know that their unborn 8 
children are human beings, abortion providers would not be afraid to fully inform them of the 9 
facts.  10 
42. Justice Saunders’ most serious error was her failure to address the issue that she herself 11 
raised.  She failed to rule on the truth or falsity of the assertion that unborn children are human 12 
beings of the same value as other human beings. 13 
43. The question of whether an unborn child is a human being is distinct from the question of 14 
whether a court or legislature recognizes a child as a person with juridical status.  The U.S. 15 
Supreme Court implicitly made the distinction between human being and person in Roe v. Wade, 16 
410 US 113 at 181 (1973).  It avoided answering the question of whether unborn children are 17 
alive and simply ruled that unborn children are not persons with juridical status. 18 
44. This Court cannot avoid answering the question of the unborn child’s humanity in the 19 
context of a section 1 weighing of freedom of expression rights against other interests.  Since a 20 
section 1 analysis is fundamentally political in nature, as opposed to judicial, the Court must 21 
consider the value of the child as a human being for balancing purposes regardless of its status as 22 
a juridical person. 23 
45. Assuming for the moment that the Court of Appeal is correct that human beings have no 24 
juridical status except that which is granted by the will of the state, surely this Court would not 25 
go so far as to hold that human beings have no inherent value or that their only worth is what the 26 
state imputes to them. 27 
 28 
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 1 
46. This Court must reaffirm the fact that all human beings have inherent value and make it 2 
clear that the worth of human beings does not depend simply upon the decree of the brightest, or 3 
the most powerful, or the most educated, or even of the majority. If all valuation is purely 4 
subjective, then the entire s. 1 process of balancing competing values is a simply a façade for 5 
engaging in interest group politics. 6 
 7 
II. ARE UNBORN CHILDREN THE ONLY CLASS OF HUMAN BEINGS IN 8 
CANADA WHO HAVE NO PROTECTION UNDER THE  SECTION 7 CHARTER 9 
DECLARATION THAT “EVERYONE HAS THE RIGHT TO LIFE . . . .”?  10 
 11 
47. The Supreme Court of Canada has never ruled whether unborn children enjoy any of the 12 
protections afforded under the s. 7 of the Charter.  If they have no protection whatsoever, they 13 
would be the only class of human beings thus far identified as completely outside the protection 14 
of law.  That would place Canada in a very exclusive club of nations. 15 
48. The implication of this Court’s decisions in abortion-related cases, and of the lower 16 
courts in this case, is that unborn children are human beings, since all have asserted that 17 
Parliament may confer rights on the unborn.  These decisions further imply that courts may limit 18 
an unborn child’s right to life by weighing it against non-life-threatening interests of others. 19 
49. It is impossible to reconcile this view, in which human beings have only those rights that 20 
states give them, with the common law view that rights are a gift of God, or the international 21 
human rights documents that assert the inalienability of rights, or the Charter’s Preamble which 22 
declares that “Canada is founded on principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule 23 
of law.” 24 
50. The lower courts have relied upon the language of Winnipeg Child and Family Services 25 
(Northwest Area) v. G.(D.F.), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925 which states that the decision to extend the  26 
protection of law to a class of human beings is a “normative” decision.  For example, Mr. Justice 27 
Hood, in reliance on Winnipeg, ruled that defining “everyone” is not an issue of science, 28 
language, religion, social choices or moral values. Demers, at 8, 12; paras. 15, 26.  He wrote that  29 
 12 
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 1 
it is a normative task to be accomplished by looking to the common law. [Ibid. at 35-37; paras. 2 
75-78].  He wrote that any change in the rights of unborn children must be effected by 3 
Parliament.  Mr. Justice Hood specifically rejected arguments that the common law protected the 4 
unborn child or that international law recognizes the right to life of the unborn. Ibid. at 44; para. 5 
89]. 6 
51. He ignored the numerous cases in which this Court has relied upon morals, science, 7 
religion, values, and even language.  Additionally, there are numerous cases in which this Court 8 
has ruled that a legislative enactment violates the Charter and other cases in which it has ruled 9 
that the Charter does not simply incorporate common law rights. Here are several examples:  10 
a. Morals:  This Court has stated that “[t]his [denial of presumption of innocence] is 11 
radically and fundamentally inconsistent with the societal values of human dignity and liberty 12 
which we espouse . . . .” R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 at para. 61.  “The truly novel features 13 
of the Constitution Act, 1982 are that it has . . . extended its scope so as to encompass a broader 14 
range of values.” Reference Re Section 94(2) of the Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 15 
para. 13.  “The Court must be guided by the values and principles essential to a free and 16 
democratic society . . . .” Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493 at para. 140. 17 
b. Science:  “The fetus’ complete physical existence is dependent on the body of the 18 
woman.”  See Dobson [1999] 2 S.C.R. at paras. 17, 20, 25, 37.  Even in Winnipeg Child this 19 
Court relied on a kind of layman’s science stating that an unborn child could not sue its mother 20 
because that “posits the anomaly of one part of a legal and physical entity suing itself.” Winnipeg 21 
Child, [1997] 3 S.C.R. at para. 27.  “Such a legal conception, moreover, is belied by the reality of 22 
the physical situation; for practical purposes, the unborn child and its mother-to-be are bonded in 23 
a union separable only by birth.” Ibid. at para. 29.   24 
c. Religion:  This Court has ruled that “the origins of the demand for such freedoms 25 
[conscience and religion] are to be found in the religious struggles in post-Reformation Europe.” 26 
Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at para. 118.  “Attempts to compel belief or practice denied 27 
the reality of individual conscience and dishonoured the God that had planted it in His creatures.” 28 
 13 
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 1 
 2 
Ibid. at para. 120.  “The ecclesiastical authorities, however, had no such problem and 3 
legal historians seem to agree that the ecclesiastical influence was largely responsible for moving 4 
the focus to the mental element in common law crime . . . .” Re s. 94(2), [1985] 2 S.C.R. at para. 5 
112.  6 
d. Language:  This Court, not surprisingly, has ruled that language is important in 7 
constitutional litigation.  “In my view, this analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the 8 
right or freedom in question is to be sought by reference to the character and the larger objects of 9 
the Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom . . . .” Ibid. at 10 
para. 22.  “This was followed by a detailed analysis of the language and structure of the section 11 
as well as its immediate context within the Charter.” Ibid. at para. 59.    12 
e. Common law:  Even if it were true that the common law did not recognize the 13 
right to life of unborn children, this Court has stated that “the Charter, as a constitutional 14 
document, is fundamentally different from the statutory Canadian Bill of Rights, which was 15 
interpreted as simply recognizing and declaring existing rights.” Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at para. 16 
38.  “[T]he meaning of the concept of freedom of conscience and religion is not to be determined 17 
solely by the degree to which that right was enjoyed by Canadians prior to proclamation of the 18 
Charter.” Big M Drug Mart, [1985] 1 S.C.R. at para. 115.  Even the meaning of the Charter is 19 
not fixed at the time of adoption of the Charter.  Supposedly it is a “living tree” whose meaning 20 
can’t be frozen in time and whose growth must not be stunted by compliance with its original 21 
meaning. Re s. 94(2), [1985] 2 S.C.R. at para. 53. 22 
f. Deference to Parliament:  This Court has stated, “the Charter is intended to set a 23 
standard upon which present as well as future legislation is to be tested.” Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 24 
at para. 38.  “In Canada, we have tempered parliamentary supremacy by entrenching important 25 
rights and freedoms in the Constitution.” Ibid. at para. 39.  Unlike the Charter, the Canadian Bill 26 
of Rights “did not reflect a clear constitutional mandate to make judicial decisions having the 27 
 14 
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effect of limiting or qualifying the traditional sovereignty of Parliament." Re s. 94(2), [1985] 2 1 
S.C.R. at para. 55.  Once a Charter violation is identified, the courts have a host of remedies 2 
 3 
available including “striking down the legislation, severance of the offending sections, striking 4 
down or severance with a temporary suspension of the declaration of invalidity, reading down, 5 
and reading provisions into the legislation.” Vriend, [1998] 1 S.C.R. at para. 145. 6 
52. The lower courts have extracted from Winnipeg Child a philosophy of jurisprudence that 7 
makes human will rather than reason the measure of law.  This philosophy is contrary to our 8 
thousand year-old Western Legal Tradition and is antithetical to the very notions of the rule of 9 
law, inalienable rights and constitutionalism. 10 
53. The “normative” interpretive principle set forth in Winnipeg Child is inconsistent with so 11 
many principles of Charter interpretation forwarded by this Court in other opinions that it 12 
provides an excellent case study for Critical Legal Studies proponents as they seek to imbue law 13 
students with the belief that there is no such thing as a rule of law, there is only a grab bag of 14 
inconsistent principles that courts may call upon to justify any particular result that they wish to 15 
reach, ensuring that predetermined policy choices are clothed with the specious authority of law.  16 
54. The Crown has taken the position that adjudication of all s. 7 rights, including the right to 17 
life, involves a three-step process.  In this case those steps would be: (1) determine whether 18 
unborn children are included within the term “everyone” and whether their lives have been 19 
violated, (2) determine whether that violation is in accordance with principles of fundamental 20 
justice, and (3) if not in accordance with fundamental justice, determine whether that violation 21 
can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 22 
55. The Crown advocates the indefensible position that intentionally killing innocent human 23 
beings may be justified under s. 1 of the Charter. 24 
56. The scope of the right to life should not be determined by use of the same three-step 25 
process of analysis as other s. 7 rights.  Instead it must be limited to a two-step process that is 26 
consistent with the most basic common law and international law principles.  27 
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57 Step One:  Has the right to life been violated?  In this case the issue under step one is 1 
whether unborn children fall within the meaning of everyone.  If they are included in the term 2 
“everyone,” there is clearly a violation of the right to life. 3 
 4 
58. No dichotomy should be made between “human being” and “person afforded juridical 5 
status.”  Although a distinction can be made between human being and juridical personhood, that 6 
distinction entails a fundamental rejection of the nature and origin of rights recognized in the 7 
common law, customary international law, modern human rights conventions, the Charter’s  8 
Preamble and even the Queen’s Coronation Oath.  The human rights conventions in particular 9 
make it clear that no human being will be denied protection of law or juridical status as a person.  10 
59. Several human rights treaties and other instruments generally recognize the right to life in 11 
the broadest and most inclusive language.  Several make specific reference to the unborn, and do 12 
not make specific reference to any other group.  Examples: “every human being” and “person,” 13 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (1945) (1965) art. 1]; “everyone” and 14 
“person,” Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), art. 3 [“Universal Declaration”]; and 15 
“every human being,” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) art. 6(1) 16 
[“ICCPR”].  17 
60. Several instruments specifically address and protect the unborn. 18 
 a.  American Convention: “For the purposes of this Convention, ‘person’ means every 19 
human being.” art. 1(2).  “Every person has the right to recognition as a person before the law.” 20 
Art. 3.  “Every person has the right to have his life respected.  This right shall be protected by law 21 
and, in general, from the moment of conception.  No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.” 22 
Art. 4(1).  “Capital punishment shall not be . . . applied to pregnant women.” Art. 4(5).  23 
 b.  World Medical Association, Declaration of Geneva (1948):  “I will maintain the 24 
utmost respect for human life from the time of conception; even under threat, I will not use my 25 
medical knowledge contrary to the laws of humanity.” 26 
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 c.  U.N. Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959):  “[T]he child, by reason of his 1 
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal 2 
protection, before as well as after birth.” Preamble. 3 
 4 
 5 
 6 
 d.  Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989):  “Bearing in mind that, as indicated in 7 
the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, ‘the child, by reason of his physical and mental 8 
immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as 9 
well as after birth.’” Preamble. 10 
 e.  ICCPR: “Sentence of death . . . shall not be carried out on pregnant women.” Art. 6(5). 11 
61. The right to life is a reality that law can neither create nor destroy.  The state must simply 12 
recognize and articulate that human rights exist independently of, and predate the existence of, 13 
positive law.  This view is manifest in several of the human rights documents that recognize 14 
rights as “inherent” and “inalienable.”  Examples include “inherent dignity” and “inalienable 15 
rights,” Universal Declaration, Preamble; and “fundamental human rights stem from the attributes 16 
of human beings,” African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights, (1981), Preamble. 17 
62. Step Two:  Principles of fundamental justice.  The methodology for determining 18 
principles of fundamental justice must be distinguished from s. 1 analysis.  The methodology for 19 
applying principles of fundamental justice involves the application of rules of law and is judicial 20 
in nature.  The s. 1 balancing analysis for determining limits imposable in a free and democratic 21 
society involves a weighing of competing interests and is fundamentally political (legislative) in 22 
nature. 23 
63. A judicial approach to determining the scope of the right to life entails making a 24 
determination as to whether there is a rule of law that justifies taking life.  For example, the life 25 
of a person may be taken if he poses an imminent threat of death or serious bodily harm to 26 
another.  A balancing approach asks whether it is all right to kill and eat the cabin boy in order to 27 
 17 
 
MEMORANDUM OF ARGUMENT           PART III                           BRIEF OF ARGUMENT 
 
save the lives of three persons or even one person if his life is deemed more valuable. R. v. 1 
Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 at 287-88 (1884). 2 
64. International law rejects the balancing methodology for defining the scope of the right to 3 
life, just as the common law rejects it. International law distinguishes between derogable and 4 
nonderogable rights.  The right to life is a nonderogable right.  Therefore innocent life cannot be 5 
 6 
 7 
intentionally taken even in time of national emergency unless someone has committed some 8 
grave moral breach as defined by rules of law.  Only derogable rights may be altered in the name 9 
of expediency.   See for example European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 10 
Fundamental Freedoms (1950) [“European Convention”], art. 15(2); American Convention, art. 11 
27(2); ICCPR, art. 4(2). 12 
65. Article 2 of the European Convention gives the most comprehensive rule of law for 13 
defining the scope of the right to life, its provisions mirroring the common law: 14 
(1) Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life 15 
intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a 16 
crime for which this penalty is provided by law. 17 
(2) Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this 18 
Article when it results from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary: 19 
     (a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence; 20 
     (b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully 21 
           detained; 22 
     (c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 23 
Additionally, article 15(2) excepts “deaths resulting from lawful acts of war.”  24 
66. Taking human life is justified only by one of these rules and not by a balancing of 25 
interests of one person against another or others.  “Necessity” does not justify the intentional 26 
taking of innocent life. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. at 288. 27 
67. Step Three:  Demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.   This Court 28 
must make it clear that intentionally taking innocent life can never be justified as an act of 29 
necessity, that the courts may never go to step three, and that the right to life is nonderogable 30 
under the Charter. 31 
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 1 
CONCLUSION 2 
68. Lord Bracton stated that it is the law that makes the king, not the king who makes the 3 
law.  The lower courts have interpreted Winnipeg Child’s “normative” approach in such a way as 4 
to stand this most basic principle of the common law on its head, claiming that there is no law 5 
except that which the King makes. 6 
 7 
69. This Court must affirm that human beings have inherent value, that rights are not simply 8 
a gift of the state, and that courts must protect innocent life even when it may not seem 9 
expedient. 10 
70. This Court must reaffirm and apply the sound principles of constitutional interpretation 11 
that it has relied on in so many of its opinions and reject the reasoning of Winnipeg Child and 12 
other related cases which reduce law to nothing more than a triumph of the will. 13 
 14 
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 1 
PART IV 2 
 3 
No costs were awarded in the lower courts and therefore the applicant does not seek costs of this 4 
application.5 
 20 
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 1 
PART V – ORDER REQUESTED 2 
 3 
 It is respectfully submitted that the application should be allowed and leave to appeal to 4 
this Honourable Court granted to appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal for British 5 
Columbia. 6 
 7 
 8 
 9 
DATED at _____________________________, this ___ day of _____________, 2003 10 
 11 
 12 
 13 
 14 
 15 
______________________________ 16 
James R. Demers, pro se 17 
